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Thisresearchexaminesthe transformationofHungarianagriculturalproductioncooperatives.
Incontrast to early expectations, cooperatives did notexperience much membership loss. Rather,
the enterprises held together, although they downsized. The distribution of collective assets oc-
curred quickly and created much tension. The sector experienced a severe decapitalization, and
theefficiency ofthesectorfell. Therewasa sharprise inunemployment.Sales andmarketingwere
disrupted. Thus, the cooperatives transformed in a very hostile situation. They survived, and
someprospered,yet,ingeneral,theyremainvulnerabletoadverseeconomicdevelopments.Healthy
cooperatives will be vital to the success ofsmallerprivate farms.
As inother former socialist nations, Hungarianagriculturalproductioncoop-
eratives were formed against the free will of farmers, yet they evolved to domi-
nateHungarianagriculture. By 1989,48.5percentofagriculturaloutputwaspro-
ducedbycooperatives,15.9 percentbystatefarms, and36.1 percentbysmall-scale
producerswhoweremainlyassistedbyagriculturalcooperatives. Forgrainsand
oilseeds 78.4 percent and for livestock 35.4 percent ofoutput originated on pro-
ductioncooperatives. Thisprogressresulted from a successfuladjustmentto their
economicenvironment.
After 1968, the so-called new economic management system was adopted,
which introduced elements of a market economy and generated rapid agricul-
tural production growth. That growthwas based on the production cooperative
organizationas wellasonthe diversefarmingandownershipmixofthe so-called
"Hungarian model." Between 1987 and 1989, as economic reforms continued,
severalothermeasurespositivelyaffected Hungarianagriculture.Anewandcom-
parativelyliberal LandAct largely eliminatedrestrictions on acquiringproperty.
Italso becamepossiblefor memberstoleave a cooperative. Further,preparations
for a comprehensive land reform commenced.
Despitesuchprogress, reform efforts sometimesfaced political obstacles, and,
as a result, new hopes were awakened with political changes in the late 1980s.
Decision makers hoped that the expected benefits of the privatization of large-
scale farms would overcome most of the handicaps and difficulties experienced
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byHungarianagriculture. ThemajoritypartyintheParliamentbelievedthatfarm-
erswantedtocontroltheirlandandoperateas individualfamily farmers. Hence,
the agricultural production cooperatives were to be disbanded, and legislation
was enacted to transform the farm structure ofHungary. The CompensationAct
used a complicated and indirect method to implementa partialreturnofland to
the general public withthe average area obtained only three to four hectares (7.4
to 9.9 acres).l Thisresulted ina morefragmented ownershippatternfor landthan
everbefore. The mandatorytransformationandfull non-land assets distribution
ofcooperatives wereestablished in a separate act.
This article reviews the impacts and consequences of these two acts, which
governed the process of decollectivization in Hungarian agriculture during the
period 1990 to 1994. Theresearchis basedonananalysis ofthe transformationof
104 production cooperatives-a representative sample of 10 percent (T6th and
Varga 1995). As describedsubsequently,this transitionhasbeendifficultfor Hun-
garianagriculture and the nationas a whole. The effects experienced to date dif-
fer from the originalexpectations.
Changes in Enterprise Organization Forms
One aspect of the transformation of agriculture in Hungary was that enter-
prises from the socialist period were required to reorganize and to select a busi-
nessform appropriate to a marketeconomy. Foragriculturalproductioncoopera-
tives this occurred undervery difficult circumstances as enterprisesexperienced
a crisis of reduced earnings, liquidity problems, and disrupted marketing chan-
nels. Anothersetbackfor enterpriseswasthenearlycompleteterminationofagri-
cultural subsides, althoughinHungary these had been small compared to other
socialist nations and even to Western Europe. Due to the economic and political
pressureonenterprises,28.8 percentoffarmer cooperatives declaredbankruptcy
and liquidated2 (table 1).
TABLE I. Numberand Share ofFarmer Cooperatives In Bankruptcy Proceedings
and Liquidation by Re,lon.
Region Cooperatives Cooperatives in Bankruptcy, liquidation
(from 1989to 1994)
(1989) Number Share (percent)
Trans-Danubia 508 106 20.9
Great Hungarian Plain 569 183 32.2
Northern Hungary 182 76 41.8
Total Hungary 1,259 363 28.8
Source: Informational Directorate of the Research and Informational Institute for Agricultural Economics,
Budapest, 1994.
The agricultural production cooperatives surveyed in this study reorganized
during 1992. With reorganization, 94.3 percent selected a new form of coopera-
tive operation,and5.7 percentdecidedinfavor ofeither ajointstockcompanyor
a limited liability company (table 2).
Reorganization as a new production cooperative meant changes as well. Un-
der socialism the cooperative's power was formally vested in the membershipTheTransformation ofHungarian Production Cooperatives/Toth, Vorgo, ondPoor/berg 53
TABLE 2. Organization Forms and Production SharesAfterTransformation
Form Farms Production Profile
No. Share Mixed Crops Livestock Service Process. Mktng.
percent percent
Cooperatives:
Farmer 65 62.5 77.0 16.9 1.5 3.1 1.5 0
Farmer, Servo 16 15.4 81.1 6.3 6.3 6.3 0 0
Production,
Serv., Mktng. 11 10.6 81.8 9.1 0 0 0 9.1
Other 6 5.8 66.6 16.7 16.7 0 0 0
Limited Liability 1 0.9 100.0 0 0 0 0 0
Limited Share 5 4.8 60.0 0 0 40.0 0 0
Total Successors 104 100.0 77.0 13.5 2.9 4.8 0.9 0.9
assembly which, inprinciple, made all decisions. A directorate was elected from
thatassemblywiththe responsibility for actualoperatingdecisions. While a very
similar structure remained after the reorganization of the cooperative, the bal-
ance ofpower shifted infavor ofthe directorate. Aseparate group ofmembers to
monitorthe directoratewasestablished. This structuregave the directorate more
latitude to make decisions onenterprise operationswithouthaving to answer to
the full membership assembly.
The transformation had three general trends:
1. one or more legal successors were established from the enterprise, but the
former farm remained as an economic unit;
2. groups ofmembers departed and formed independenteconomic units; and
3. members left the cooperative as individuals.
The farm remained intact in28 percentofthe cooperatives surveyed. The major-
ityofcooperativesexperiencedsomeexitofmembers,eitheringroupsoras indi-
viduals. In 6 percent of cases, groups departed to form their own independent
economic units. In50 percentofcases, only individualsleft the cooperatives,and
16 percent of cooperatives experienced losses ofboth individuals and groups.
Despite the arguments and actions in Parliament favoring individual family
farmers, exitingmembersorgroupsrarelyconsistedofmemberswhowere active
in the operationof the farm. After years of cooperative farming under socialism,
individuals lacked the skills and knowledge to be individual farmers. Only 6.6
percentof active members left as a group, and 3.5 percent ofactive members left
onanindividualbasis. Individualmembersleavingthecooperativeswerequickly
confronted with experiences for which they were unprepared, and, as of mid-
1994,19.9 percentofthese farmers hadquitfarming. Retirees were also reluctant
to leave, perhapsduetothe lackofalternatives,as87.7percentremainedwiththe
legal successor to the enterprise3 (table 3).
Thetransformationwas associatedwithverylittlechangeintheuse ofagricul-
turalland. Successor enterprises retained 80.2 percent of their former land with
only4.5 percentofthe land removedbyexiting membersorgroups. The remain-
ing land either passed to successor enterprises not surveyed inthe study orwas
cultivated by members who, although no longer employed by the cooperative,
continued tobe members.54 Journal of Cooperatives 1996
TABLE·].Resource Changes During theTransformation.
Enterprise Type Human Resources Agr. Area Capital
Active Retirees Employees Total Assets Liabilities
Members Members
number hectares mIllion HUE
Predecessor' 29,928 19,782 8,824 58,534 435,425 32,623 5,896
Successorb 16,226 17,350 3,237 36,813 349,404 32,733 5,770
Independent Groups 1,976 964 166 3,106 10,082 1,885 153
Individual 1,057 1,249 74 2,380 9,386 1,317 76
Share ofdistribution: predecessor, December 31,1989= 100percent
Successorb 54.2 87.7 36.7 62.8 80.2
Independent Groups 6.6 4.8 1.9 5.3 2.3
Individual 3.5 6.3 0.8 4.1 2.2
Altogether 64.3 98.8 39.4 72.2 84.7
Non-surveyed





Most of the removed property was distributed without encumbrance as exiting
members assumed as little as 4 percentofthedebtburdens. Thus, theburdenfor
the new farmers was substantially less than justified by the value of the assets
removed. Yet, inHungarythe political atmospheredidnotsupporta more realis-
tic solution. This situation is in sharp contrast to that in former East Germany
where disagreements over assumption ofold debts were and remain a handicap
to the emergingfarms.
Asinotherformersocialistnations, the Hungariantransformationwasassoci-
ated with a downsizing of enterprises. The average land of legal successors fell
by 20 percent to 3,359 hectares (8,297 acres). Information on the size of land for
exitingmembersis unavailable,buttheseunitsranged insizefrom afew hectares
to several hundred. The average size of land held by exiting individuals is only
3.9 hectares (9.6 acres), which(outsideofintensivecultivation,horticulturalcrops,
for example) cannotprovide sufficient income (table 4).
As noted before, very few cooperative members quit, although there was sig-
nificant regional variation. Of those that did leave the production cooperative,
themajority (86 percent) wereblue-collarfarmworkers. Inadditionto the degree
of entrepreneurial drive and financial resources available, strong emotional fac-
tors influenced thedecision to leave the cooperative. Thehistoric traditionofpri-
vateproduction, theemotionsassociatedwithfamily farming, andanostalgiafor
the"good olddays" all played a role inencouragingindividualstoexit the coop-
erative. The importance of that last emotion seems to be confirmed by the large
shareofretirees amongthosewholeft thecooperatives. Inmostcases, theseretir-
ees chose to go their own way in the hope of receiving support from their ex-
tendedfamily.TheTransformation ofHungarian Production Cooperatives/Toth, Vatg£4 andPaar/betg
TABLE 4. Shifts In Production Resources DurlngTransformatlon.
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percent persons ha. thdHUF/ha
Predecessor 51.1 33.8 15.1 51 4,187 74.9 13.5
Successors 44.1 47.1 8.1 89 3,359 93.7 16.5
Partnerships 34.1 0.4 65.1 0.3 41.2 6.6
Independent
Groups 63.7 31.0 5.3 45
Individuals 44.4 52.5 3.1 110 3.9a
•Agricultural area per person.
Ownership of Non-LandAssets After theTransformation
The transformation of Hungarian agriculture has radically changed owner-
ship relations in the production cooperatives. A major force in this process has
beentheidentificationanddistributionofformernon-landcollectiveassets among
the co-owners. Onepurpose of this distribution was to create and foster the atti-
tude ofownership.
The identification of non-land assets was implemented in two stages. Early
reforms in 1989 enabled the identification of 50 percent of the collective assets,
and the majority ofenterprises and members took advantage of this. In the asset
division, the cooperativesconsidered thenumberofyearsworked, theworkper-
formance, the time spentas a member, and the extentof assets contributed to the
enterprise. After a long delay, the process of changing ownership began in 1992
andwasimplemented in an unrealistically shorttime-just over three months.
Several problems arose inthis change, with the greatest difficulties causedby
the formation ofvariousgroups ofclaimants withconflicting interests. The issue
of outside owners was particularly sensitive
4
• One group of claimants consisted
of members active in the farm's operation who were interested in the long-run
use of the assets as well as securing a permanent job and income. They were
interested in obtaining regular earnings from their labor, in increasing the value
of the assets, and in the dividendson theirholdings. Theyconstituted 24 percent
ofclaimants, and they received 41 percentof the assets (table 5). A second group
consisted of retiree members who retained their rights concerning the manage-
ment of the enterprise. Their interest was to increase their short-run dividends.
This group represented31.6 percentofclaimants, and they obtained39.2 percent
of the assets. Nearly 20 percent of the collective assets passed to heirs of former
cooperativememberswho, for themostpart,werenotinvolvedintheenterprise.
Their claim to enterprise assets was very hotly debated. This group represented
the largest share of claimants-44.4 percent. They sought the highest possible
dividends, obtained as quickly as possible. That is, they wanted to convert their
claims to money as soon as they could.
Atthe sametimeasnon-landassets werebeingdistributed,itbecamepossible
for memberstoleavetheproductioncooperativeandtophysicallytaketheirshares56 Journal of Cooperatives 1996
TABLE 5. Owner and Ownership Structure ofEnterprisesAfter the Identification
ofCollectiveAssets".
OwnerType Number Share Asset Value Division Asset Value per
Capita
persons percent thdHUE percent HUE/person
Total Active: 22,931 24.0 11,877,126 41.0 517.9
Remaining 19,749 86.1 9,965,320 83.9 504.6
Group exit 2,102 9.1 1,246,196 10.4 592.8
Individual
exit 1,072 4.6 557,042 4.6 519.6
Total Retiree: 30,237 31.6 11,350,485 39.2 375.3
Remaining 27,238 90.0 9,974,119 87.8 366.1
Group exit 1,345 4.4 719,020 6.3 534.5
Individual
exit 1,308 4.3 543,454 4.7 415.4
Outsiders: 42,452 44.4 5,711,920 19.8 134.5
Remaining 41,275 97.2 5,506,748 96.4 133.4
Exited 1,176 2.7 205,167 3.5 174.4
Total 95,620 100.0 28,939,531 100.0 302.6
'For the 104 enterprises surveyed.
withthem. This producedtwobasicproblems. First,non-landassetsdesignedfor
the large scale enterprises, like machinery, were not appropriate for use by the
smaller-sized farms created by exiting members. Also, removal of these assets
hurtthe efficiency ofthose assets remaining with the enterprise.
Theremovalofassets from thecooperative-apartfrom thetensionscreated-
did notcreate conditions favorable to individual farming. Thus, the overwhelm-
ingmajorityofthenewowners(86 to 97percent) lefttheirassetholdingswiththe
cooperative'slegalsuccessor (table5). Fortheseassets, theyreceiveincomeinthe
form ofdividendsfrom the enterpriseifitis profitable. Only6.2 percentofclaim-
ants decided to use their assets outsideofthesuccessorenterprise. Nearlyhalfof
those who left the cooperative decided not to farm, but rather sold their share of
the cooperative's non-land assets. This desire to cash their claims resulted from
the dramaticdeclineinrurallivingconditions,whichencouragedpeopleto spend
the unexpected money quickly. Thus, not only was the agricultural production
cooperative harmed by the withdrawal of assets and capital, but the population
consumed its productive assets.
The DecapitalizationofHungarian Agriculture
The transformation of the Hungarian economy prompted an increased
decapitalization of agriculture. During the middle 1980s, the expansion of pro-
ductivecapacitystoppedduetoinadequatefinancial resources,and,bythe1990s,
even investment to maintain the existing technology ceased. Thus, Hungarian
agriculture has been consuming its productive resources, and the level of tech-
nologyemployed,whichhadonce beenhighbyinternationalstandards,has been
falling inrecent years.TheTransformation ofHungarian Production Cooperatives!Toth, VaJg£4 andPaarlbeJg 57
The extent ofasset depletion during the transformation varied by asset type.
Machinery and equipment-trucks and tractors-showed the greatest decline
(table 6). The average age of machinery and vehicles in 1989 was six to eight
years, butby 1993 had reached eight to ten years. Buildings and other structures
exhibitedmoremoderatechanges-livestockbuildingsin1993 averagedtwenty-
two to twenty-fouryears old. Capacity utilizationalso fell. Inthe enterprisessur-
veyed, capacity use was as low as 68 percent.
The declineinproductivecapacity occurredbecause the legal successor enter-
prises did not have the financial resources to offset diminishing asset quantity
and falling quality. Between1989 and 1993, only half of the enterprises surveyed
bought tractors, and only every third farm purchased combines or trucks (table
6). Much of the breeding stock was destroyed to generate quick money, and the
breeding of animals was curtailed. These adjustments resulted inthe low rate of
capacity utilization in livestock buildings designed for large scale operations. In
addition, 4 to 9 percent of the livestock were takenby those exiting the coopera-
tives. These peoplekept fewer animals thantheyhadreceived whenthey left the
cooperatives, as they slaughtered animals for quick cash. The slaughter rate for
cattle was the highest at 70 percent, but more than 50 percent of the swine and
sheep obtained from the cooperative were slaughtered. The legal successors to
theproductioncooperatives also slaughteredlarge numbers ofanimals (table 7).
Depending on the type of animal, only 40 to 60 percent of the 1989 livestock can
be found in the successor organizations. Non-cooperative farmers also severely
reduced livestock from 1990 through 1994. The number of cattle fell 19 percent,
TABLE 6. Changes In Production Capacities from 1989 to 1993.
Description Total Capacities Share of Share ofnew
capacity of taken out, successors capacities
successors sold from establishing (1993)
(1993) 1989 to 1993 new
capacities" Total
Total (percent) capacity in
capacity in (percent) 1989=100%
1989=100
Machinery
Tractors 70.9 19.7 55.8 4.7
Harvesting 75.1 5.3 31.7 5.3
Trucks 56.8 2.2 30.7 2.2
Buildings
Cows 83.6 9.9 1.9 2.6
Other cattle 83.7 11.3 3.8 0.8
Swine 85.7 8.4 1.9 0.5
Sheep 69.6 18.0
Poultry 57.7 8.3
Grain storage 104.4 4.7 8.6 3.1
Plantations
Grape 38.3 33.8 2.8 0.1
Fruit 52.8 30.4 4.8 2.8
'Number of all surveyed successors = 10058 Journal of Cooperatives 1996
TABLE 7. Changes in Livestock by LivestockType, 1989to 1993.
Type Number of Farms" 1989 1993 Index
Total Share
number percent head 1989=100
Cattle 81 77.9 93,405 54,375 58.2
Cows 32,760 23,225 70.9
Swine 53 51.0 274,542 150,660 54.9
Sows 20,643 12,993 62.9
Sheep 45 43.3 93,664 34,848 37.2
Ewes 66,915 29,592 44.2
Poultry 23 22.1 1,202,789 529,553 44.0
Laying hens 225,344 228,829 101.5
'The 104 surveyed enterprises only.
with cows decreasing by 20 percent. Total swine numbers fell 44 percent, with
sows declining 56 percent.
Landed Property and Leasing
The major changes occurring in land ownership in conjunction with the new
pattern of ownership for non-land assets adversely affected the performance of
the sector. During the socialist years, Hungarian production cooperatives culti-
vated land in private ownership (34 percent), in collective ownership (62 per-
cent), and land ownedby the state (4 percent). The land inprivate and collective
ownershipcould have servedas a goodbasis to ensurethatthosewhoownedthe
land operated it. However, the compensationacts usedcrop land to providepar-
tial compensation for former property owners and to redress social injustices.
Thus, a considerable part of the land passed to owners either indirectly tied to
agricultural production or to those unconnected with agriculture. This harmed
those who were under fifty years oldand earning a living from agriculture.
During the changeinownership, crop land and the non-land assets necessary
for its cultivationbecame separated. Some new owners own only land and have
no other productive assets. Others have non-land assets, but insufficient land to
employthoseassets. Thus, withmultipleownersofall the differentassets, combi-
nations of productionresources must evolve to efficiently use these factors, and
that is very expensive. This situationis complicatedby the fact that agricultural
productioncooperativesandotherentrepreneurialpartnerships-alongwithfor-
eigners-areforbidden from acquiring landS.
For the productioncooperatives in this study, 93.2 percent of the land passed
to private owners, and 62.9 percent of that land is owned by active and retiree
members. Outsidersown37.1 percentofthe land (table8). Cooperativemembers
actively cultivating the landcomprisejustoverone-fifth ofthe owners,butactu-
ally own less than 20 percent of the land.
Thus,thetransformedcooperativeshadtoandmustcontinueto developoppor-
tunities for the joint use of land by creating legal relationships for leasing while
simultaneouslysettlingunresolvedownershipissues. ThelegalsuccessorssurveyedTABLE 8. Changes in Land Ownershipa.
May 31,1989 Private of Which May 31, 1994
Private Coop. State Total Total Member Outsider Coop. Total
Owned Area Owned Owned
Tilled:
Hectares 103,804 220,966 6,671 226,358 226,358 139,049 87,309 9,676 236,034
Share 31.3 66.7 2.0 100.0 95.9 61.4 38.6 4.1 100.0
Grape, fruit:
Hectares 1,702 4,706 53 6,461 4,217 2,366 1,851 421 4,638
Share 26.3 42.8 0.9 100.0 90.9 56.1 43.9 9.1 100.0
Agr. area:
Hectares 115,763 288,990 11,308 416,061 293,835 174,028 119,807 17,457 311,292
Share 27.8 69.5 2.7 100.0 94.0 59.2 40.8 5.6 100.0
Total area:
Hectares 127,250 339,324 11,906 478,480 308,963 194,211 114,752 22,714 331,677
Share 26.6 70.9 2.5 100.0 93.2 62.9 37.1 6.8 100.0
'The 104 surveyed enterprises.60 Journal of Cooperatives 1996
TABLE 9. CollectivelyCultivatedArea Leased, 1994.
Area Leased From: Cooperative Total Share of
Owned Area Area Collectively
Members Outsiders Other Cultivated
Lessor Area"
Tilled:
Hectares 114,024 60,220 3,670 9,676 187,590
Share 60.8 32.0 2.0 5.2 100.0 79.5
Grape, fruit:
Hectares 1,731 268 34 421 2,454
Share 70.5 10.9 1.4 17.2 100.0 52.9
Agr. area:
Hectares 147,563 71,238 5,632 17,457 241,890
Share 61.0 29.5 2.3 7.2 100.0 77.7
Total area:
Hectares 159,474 71,793 5,806 22,714 259,787
Share 61.4 27.6 2.2 8.8 100.0 78.3
'Area of the surveyed legal successors on May 31,1994, equals 100 percent.
used 78.3 percent of the total land collectively in 1994, of which 61.4 percent is
leased from members, 27.6 percent from outsiders, and 2.2 percent from other
landlords (table 9). The cooperatives themselves owned8.8 percentofthe collec-
tively used land. This means that members lease some 85 percentof their land to
the transformed production cooperatives, while outsiders lease around 60 per-
cent of their land. Thus, enterprises using land became, in fact, leasee organiza-
tions withoutlaws protecting theleasee-theuserof the land. The legal environ-
ment,withrespectto leaseholdinginits presentform, partlyimpedesthelong-run
developmentoflanduse andfurther reduces thecompetitivenessofalreadyvul-
nerable enterprises.
For land of average quality, the rental price is between 1,800 and 4,500 HUF
(Hungarianforints) perhectare-sixto sixteendollarsperacre. Competitivepres-
sures are bidding this rental price higher6•
Under socialism, enterprises controlled large areas with large fields. This pat-
tern changed during the transformation, and farms face very significant techno-
logical problems. Enterprises fragmented and the size of the large fields fell in
three-quarters of the farms. Field size declined from 20 to 50 percent. Individual
use ofland represents a new problem, as ground not cultivated by the coopera-
tive can be accidentally wedged in collectively used fields or even in a leased
plot. Such fragmented fields impedeormake impossible the application ofbasic
technologies (crop rotation,plantprotection,orenvironmentalprotection). These
unfavorable changes in land use increase cultivation costs and worsen the effi-
ciency ofmachines designed for larger field sizes (Varga 1994).
The effects of this problemare notyet fully realized. The study indicated that,
as a result ofthe unresolved compensationand unsettled land ownership issues,
a long time will be needed to rationalize land use and ownership.TheTransformation of Hungarian Production Cooperatives!Toth, VOlga, andPoor/belg 61
Employment Patterns
The output composition of the Hungarian economy has been changing since
beforethetransformationas wellas afterwards. Primaryproductionsectors, par-
ticularly agriculture, declinedwhile service sectors grew. Throughthe endofthe
1980s, these changes were coupled with a consolidation of labor use, but in the
transitionalperiodlaborwasshedatamorerapidrate. Priorto 1989, the economy
saw annual decreases in labor use of 3 to 4 percent, but after that time annual
decreases jumped to 13 to 33 percent. A small share of these people found new
work. The overwhelmingmajoritybecame unemployed.
Between 1989 and 1994, national employment fell nearly 25 percent-by 1.3
million persons. The largest reductionofemploymentoccurredinagriculture, as
more than six hundred thousand people lost their jobs, a rate two-and-one-half
times the national average. The share of agricultural and agriculturally related
employment in the national economy dropped from 17.9 percent in 1989 to 8.3
percentby thebeginningof 1994. Thatmeantthatby1994, employmentwasonly
37.7 percent of the 1989 level.
The rate and magnitude ofthe employmentdecrease were the most intense in
























In 1994, transformed agricultural cooperatives employed only 22.5 percentof
the labor used in 1989. This severely affected rural villages, as these enterprises
have traditionally beenand continue to be the major employers of village labor.
Within production cooperatives, the large decrease in employmentwas, fore-
most, a result of the shutting down of industrial and service activities once the
responsibility of these enterprises. Under socialism, agricultural production co-
operativesweremore thanproductionunits. Theyhandledfunctions thatincluded
those associated with local government as well as activities such as processing,
repair, construction, and input industries. The cessation of many of these activi-
ties by the agricultural production cooperatives adversely affected employment
and therangeofactivitiesperformedin ruralareas. Oneconsequencewasunem-
ployment in Hungary on a scale last seen in the 1930s. In contrast to some opti-
mistic forecasts, privatefarm numbershardlygrew and couldnotcreate enough
jobs to absorb the labor releasedby the cooperatives
7
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The employment decrease between 1989 and 1992 affected manual labor more
thanadministrative staff, butthatlattergroup also showed a large reduction ofover
40 percent. The administrative staff reduction adverselyaffected the performanceof
cooperatives, as thesystemofsupervisionandmanagementwasextensively simpli-
fied andinmanycases fell to unacceptable levels (T6th andVarga 1993).62 Journal of Cooperatives 1996
Thetransformedcooperativespreferredfull-time employment,althoughsmall-
scale agricultural production performed as part-time employment is no longer
formally restricted. Indeed, even before the change, there were no real obstacles
to increased household farming. The employment share of part-time labor and
retirees, although not large, fell considerably. In the farms under survey, the re-
lease of labor did not cease with the transformation, and, on average, a subse-
quentdecrease of 22.4 percent occurred (table 10).
UnderthenewCooperativeAct, theobligatoryperformanceofworkaspartof
membership was terminated in the transformed agricultural production coop-
eratives. At the same time, the cooperative was no longer required to provide
employmenttomembers. Amemberoremployeenegotiatesanemploymentcon-
tract specifying the hours worked and the compensation. Members may also ar-
rangeto performworkas entrepreneurswithinthecooperative,wherethey indi-
vidually operate one or more units of the cooperative as entepreneurs or may
operateindividualorganizationsaswell. Active memberscanalso maintaintheir
membership withoutproviding anyworkto the cooperative.
The terminationof the employmentobligationfor members is fully appropri-
ate from aneconomicpointofview, as enterprisesundersocialismcarried excess
labor (Toth 1993). Therealproblemisthatnootheremploymentalternativeshave
developed. Thus, the economically stressed productioncooperatives became the
mostsignificantsourceofruralunemployment,andthereisnopropersocial safety
net to assist rural populations, which sometimes experience a 30 to 40 percent
unemployment rate (Toth 1993).
This is confirmed by Cere (1994) who followed six hundred former coopera-
tive members between 1990 and 1994. Some 70 percent of those interviewed be-
cameunemployed,andonly25 percentsoonfound otherwork. Halfoftheunem-
ployed were out of workfor over one year, and 15 percentwere unemployed for
more than two years. Those seekingemploymentwere oftenforced to find a dif-
ferent type ofworkorto relocate, as 75 percentfound nodemandfor theirtypeof
work or profession in the vicinity oftheir residence. While 18 percent did find a
job, itwas at a much lower rate of compensation. An inadequate educationwas
cited by 14 percent as an obstacle to employment, whereas 12.5 percent referred
to theirbad state ofhealth.Around 15 percentofthosewhomarked"already too
old" were hardly overforty.
The agriculturalcooperatives surveyed inthis studyshowed thenumber of ac-
tivemembersdiminished 17.4 percentafter thetransformation. Onlytwo-thirds of
the members found a job on the enterprise (table 11). Nevertheless, many main-
tainedtheirmembership eventhoughtheywerenolonger employedbytheenter-
prise. Unemployment among this group of members at 37.5 percent is very high.
The management of the cooperative did not anticipate much improvementin the
near future as 51 percent ofthe legal successors expected additionalpersonnel re-
ductions, with the average reduction expected to be 12 percent. Those reductions
were expected to focus on blue-collar farm workers, although some reduction of
managementwasalso anticipated. Part-time employmentand a reorganization of
laborwithin the cooperativewerenot seenas veryfeasible ways to retain labor.
Sales and Integration Among Organizations
An area of much tension for cooperative producers has beensales and market-
ingrelationshipsamongthedifferentorganizations. Producerpricesfor HungarianTABLE 10. Changes in Employment in the Surveyed Enterprises.
Employee Numbers Share by Labor Type Percent change
1989 Transformation 1993 1989 Transformation 1993 Transformation 1993
Year Year Year
persons percent 1989=100
Total 39,227 18,996 14,744 100.0 100.0 100.0 -51.6 -62.4
By Job Type:
Blue 32,639 15,263 11,835 83.2 80.3 80.3 -53.2 -63.7
White 6,588 3,733 2,909 16.8 19.7 19.7 -43.3 -55.8
By Time:
Full 34,314 16,910 13,308 87.5 89.0 90.3 -50.7 -61.2
Other 2,783 1,256 893 7.1 6.6 6.0 -54.9 -67.9
Part 741 192 186 26.6 15.3 20.8 -74.1 -74.9
Retired 2,130 830 543 5.4 4.4 3.7 -61.0 -74.564 Journal of Cooperatives 1996
TABLE II. Composition ofMembenand Employees by Legal Status.
At1i'ansformation In 1993
Persons Share' Persons Share'
number percent number percent
Active Members: 20,294 85.1 16,756 82.2
Employed 15,768 66.1 10,922 53.6
Entrepreneur 89 0.4 185 0.9
Member only 4,437 18.6 5,649 27.7
Jobless 2,216 9.3 2,119 10.4
Permanent
Employee 3,550 14.9 3,623 17.8
Total 23,844 100.0 20,379 100.0













selveshandicappedbecausebuyersof their outputsand sellers ofinputsupplies
often have market power that is used to the disadvantage of the cooperative.
Additionally, contract sales, which producers could use to add certainty, have
beenloosely regulated and subject to abuse.
Severalunfavorable trends occurredinrecentyears, andorganized marketing
channels deterioratedas previousmarketing relationshipsbecamesporadic. The
integrationofsmallproducersintothe marketingsystemwasstifled, andinsome
locationssuppressed,bylargeenterprisesstrugglingwithothertroubles. The trans-
formed productioncooperatives maynow choose from among many more buy-
ers than was the case five or ten years ago. However, as markets are not well
regulated, sellers are hampered by the lack ofconfidence and trustworthiness in
buyers. In addition to the continued existence of formersales relationships, the
current selection of contract partners is limited by considerations of the buyer's
solvency. Sellers must reckon with the high rate of uncertainty in sales andwith
the possibility ofnon-payment. The market positionofagricultural producers is
worsened by the lack of reliable market information. Due to their own liquidity
problems, deferringa sale to a laterdate to obtaina morefavorable price is notan
optionfor mostcooperatives (Varga 1993).
The survey results show that a major share of the transformed organizations
prefer contractsales, which are considered to be more secure thanother options.
Of the enterprises surveyed 76.6 percent make, on average, 70 percent of their
sales through contracts with permanent commercial organizations. The share of
product sold in this way varies substantially by commodity. Contract sales ac-
count for 65.7 percentof crop products and for 80.8 percent of livestock product
marketings. The share of contractual sales increases as enterprise size increases.
Selling using the commodity exchange is not a general practice by the organiza-
tions surveyed. Few cereals are sold in this way-only3 to 5 percent.TheTransformation ofHungarian Production Cooperatives/r6th, Va'6'~ andPaarlbe'6' 65
A potentially importantrole for productioncooperatives is promoting the in-
tegration of small- and large-scale producers, and some successes have been
achieved. Cooperatives have assisted part-time, small-scale producers by offer-
inguniqueservices thatsupplementthe incomeofnotonlyworkersonthelarger
enterprises but also the general population in rural villages. An integral part of
the cooperative's role canbethe integrationof smaH-scale productionperformed
by others inthe vicinity of the cooperative and the assistance offered to this pro-
ductionthroughthevariousservicesa cooperative canoffer. Theintegrationcon-
sists partly of sales of services to promote production-selling basic inputs and
breeding stock, mechanical services, and consulting-andpartly ofpurchases of
output. About 40 percentof the populationwas involved inthis way.
The legal successors of the cooperatives reduced the size and scope of these
activities during the transformation. On80 percent offarms, activities have been
focused on field crops and interest shifted to vegetable growing and livestock
raising. One reasonwasthat,becauseservices wereoffered atreducedprices, the
costs of the cooperative were increased, and often these activities yielded only a
modest profit. Diverse activities involving a large number of non-members re-
quired financial resources thatmany cooperatives lacked. Further, confidence in
the cooperatives fell, and theywereless able to provide the specialists neededby
the small producers. The general disruption of the market, the debates and per-
sonalhostilitiesassociatedwiththedistributionofcollective assets, andjoblosses
adversely affected relations as well.
Increased efforts by cooperatives to integrate small producers based on the
cooperatives' former experiences are indispensable for a strengthening of non-
cooperative farms. These small farms lack the capital, the means, and the exper-
tise to develop a secure foundation without the support that a large-scale coop-
erative can provide. Yet, cooperatives must have sufficient capital and profit
opportunitiesto undertake this role. The provisionofservices to smallproducers
may be decisive not only to the cooperatives' viability, but also may be the only
realistic chance for non-cooperative agriculture to develop a secure foundation.
Conclusion
This article examines the transformation of agricultural production coopera-
tives inHungary. Because, undersocialism, Hungarianenterpriseshad operated
in a relativelyliberalenvironmentwithlittle statesupport,expectations for Hun-




ently. While thecooperativeswereforced to reorganizeintoforms appropriate to
a market economy, they did not experience a substantial loss of members. Most
agricultural production cooperatives remained together, although they became
somewhatsmaller.
Thetransitionentaileddistributingcollectivelyownedassets. Thisprocessoccurred
quickly and was the source of much tension. People tended to fall into one of three
groups. One group consisted of active members whohadaninterestinthe long-run
success of the successor enterprise. Othergroups tended to have short-runinterests
andsoughtcurrentincomeattheexpenseoflong-termgoals. Exitingmemberscould
take their assets withthem, and this harmed the successor enterprises.66 Journal of Cooperatives 1996
Therewereotherproblemscausedbytheassetdistribution. The sectorexperi-
enceda severe decapitalizationas livestockwereslaughteredandoldequipment
and buildings were not replaced. Land was also distributed, and this created a
fragmented patternofland ownership thatdidnotcorrespond to the ownership
ofnon-landassets. Thismeantinputrelationshipsweredistorted,andcostly and
complex relationships to useinputsefficientlyhad to develop. Thetechnological
level of Hungarian agriculture suffered. A related feature is the rise ofleasing as
enterprisescontinuedto operatemostoftheiroriginalland,butdidsobyleasing
thatland from a large number ofnew owners.
The transition of Hungarian agriculture was associated with a sharp rise in
rural unemployment. The economicallystressedenterprises shed large numbers
ofworkers. Withthelackofjobopportunitiesinothersectors,few ofthesepeople
found alternative employment. This has worsened rural living conditions and
furthered thedecapitalizationofthesectoraspeoplesoughtquicksourcesofcash.
Marketing and saleswere also disruptedby the transformation. New market-
ing relationships had to be built in conditions that fostered much uncertainty.
Contract sales offered an alternative to deal with such uncertainty. The use of
contract sales varied muchby commodity, with extensive use invegetables and
livestockproducts,butlittleuseinmarketinggrain. Productioncooperativescan
helpsmallerproducersinmarketingandbyprovidingotherservices,but,during
the transition, the new cooperatives did not have the financial resources to ac-
tively pursue that role. The ability of small producers to survive will depend on
the extent to which production cooperatives can establish connections to small
farmers. Even the viability ofcooperativesmay hinge on these activities.
Thus,Hungarianagriculturalproductioncooperativestransformedthemselves
ina veryhostile environment. Theyhavesurvived, andinsomecases prospered,
yet they presentlyremainvulnerable to adverse economic developments.
Notes
1. Former owners were given compensationnotes for lost property andcould use these
notes for land purchase at auctions or for other purposes, such as converting them into a
life-annuity.
2. Tracing members of liquidated enterprises was not pOSSible, so only reorganized
cooperatives are discussed.
3. Retirees remain cooperative members with full voting rights.
4. Outside owners are those individuals not listed as workers or retirees who, at any
time, had worked five years for the enterprise. These individuals or their heirs are entitled
to lay claim to a portion of the assets.
5. Though the former Parliament made that decision, it is still in force more than one
year after the present socialist-liberal government.
6. In the former cooperatives, retirees were aided by social supports with the main
form being household farming. This has ceased and is being replaced by owners leasing
their land.
7. The most recent survey of the Central Statistical Office shows the number of small-
scale farms falling 14 percent from 1991 to 1994. Of them, thirty-six thousand peoplewere
full-time, self-employed farmers in 1991, compared with fifty-one thousand people in
1994.
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